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Introduction
The biotechnology policies of OECD countries are very similar in many ways. Most countries promote their domestic biotech industry, for example through government-funded research and subsidies or tax breaks for start-ups. Regulation of the biotech sector is risk-based -it targets what scientific riskassessments identify as the highest risks to humans and the environment. And patents or other forms of property rights protection secure most biotech inventions.
These similarities notwithstanding, European countries and the United States have reacted very differently to the increasing use of biotechnology in agriculture. European countries have imposed severe restrictions on this new technology, particularly in terms of approval and labeling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The United States maintains a far more permissive approval policy and does not require labeling of GM-foods. In this article, we explain these differences in GMO approval and food labeling regulations primarily in terms of variation in the collective action capacity of environmental and consumer as well as producer interest groups. Moreover, we consider a twofold effect of institutions on regulatory outcomes.
Controversy over agricultural biotechnology
Since the mid-1990s, crops, foods, and food ingredients developed through recombinant DNA technologies 1 (commonly referred to as GM-seeds, GMcrops, or GM-foods 2 ) have entered the markets of the United States and several other industrialized countries on a massive scale. This has led to controversies over whether and how to regulate this new technology.
Many consumer and environmental groups have voiced strong concerns over the immediate and long-term effects of GMOs on human health. They have highlighted environmental risks, such as the reduction of biological diversity, out-crossing of superbugs, gene leakage, and agricultural sustainability of GMcrops. They have, moreover, raised broader social, ethical, religious, and economic issues associated with biotechnology (Pauker 1999) . Most European consumer groups have opposed agricultural biotechnology ever since (in 1996) GMOs entered their market. As a minimum, they have requested extensive 1 Fagan defines recombinant DNA techniques as involving "the isolation and subsequent introduction of discrete DNA segments containing the gene(s) of interest into recipient (host) organisms. The DNA segments can come from any organism (plants, animals, or microbes) ." The application of this technique is commonly referred to as genetic engineering and the products as genetically engineered or genetically modified products. See Fagan 1995. 2 The term genetically modified food is defined in this chapter as "foods and food ingredients which contain or consist of genetically modified material or which are produced from, but do not contain, genetically modified material" (Bredahl 1998: 252) . Baron 2000) . Because the world's agrochemical and agbiotech sectors are highly concentrated 4 , we would expect permissive GMO policies -in accordance with industry's preferences. The U.S. case -liberal approval regulations and absence of mandatory labeling -seems to fit the model. Yet in the EU, the concentrated and financially powerful agbiotech sector has been overwhelmed by a very heterogeneous anti-GMO coalition. This development is particularly striking because national and supranational regulators in Europe are widely assumed to maintain close ties with the industries they regulate (Lemaux 1998) . How can the EU deviation from the outcome predicted by the conventional model be explained?
The following part of the article outlines the theoretical argument that guides the comparison of GMO regulations in the EU and the United States. We then present the results of case studies on GMO regulations in the two political units. In each case study we first describe regulatory outcomes. We then explain these outcomes by focusing on the collective action capacity of consumer and environmental as well as different types of producers groups. Finally, we compare the results of the two case studies.
The analysis shows that the regulatory outcome in the EU can be traced back to NGOs' increased collective action capacity, an institutional environment favorable to NGO interests, and rifts in the producer coalition due to differences in industrial structure and consumer and NGO opposition. U.S. biotechnology politics is dominated by a strong and cohesive coalition of pro-biotech agricultural and up-and downstream producers. Low public concern and high trust in regulatory authorities have made mobilization of NGOs in the U.S. difficult and have resulted largely in their exclusion from the policy process.
Theory
The conventional political economy explanation of regulation holds that producer interests tend to dominate over consumer interests, and that regulations more often than not reflect the preferences of producers (Baron 2000 , Stigler 1971 . Whenever consumers benefit from regulation (or the absence of regulation, or deregulation), these benefits are usually coincidental (Richards 1999; Gormley 1986 ).
Our analysis of cross-national variation in GMO regulations focuses on explaining deviations from the regulatory outcome predicted by the conventional model. Such deviation is most pronounced in the European Union. In contrast, regulatory outcomes in the United States reflect the preferences of producers (permissive approval practices, no mandatory labeling). To explain deviations from the conventional model, we concentrate on the collective action capacity of environmental/consumer and of producer interest groups. We also explicitly take account of institutional factors. The explanation thus consists of three elements:
Collective action capacity of environmental and consumer groups. Due to their large and heterogeneous membership such groups are, in the conventional model, assumed to face debilitating collective action problems. They find it harder than producers to mobilize support for their activities and financial resources, both of which are necessary to effectively exert political pressure (notably, lobbying of regulators) and market pressure (notably, consumer boycotts). We argue that, due to negative consumer perceptions of GMOs, regulatory failures in other food issues, and institutional properties of the regulatory process, the collective action capacity of European environmental and consumer groups opposed to GMOs has been higher than the capacity of their U.S. counterparts. As a result, European anti-GMO groups have been more successful in influencing GMO regulations.
Collective action capacity of producers. We show that the collective action capacity of pro-GMO producers has varied substantially between the EU and the United States. We distinguish between upstream producers (agbiotech firms), farmers, and downstream producers (wholesalers, retailers, food processors) to show that differences in industrial structure, the degree of their access to relevant institutions and the extent of NGO opposition to GMOs account for variation in the collective action capacity of pro-GMO producers.
Institutions. When explaining regulatory outcomes in terms of interest group politics, institutional structures and the interests of regulators have to be taken into account. Regulatory agencies frequently have preferences of their own, as well as some room of maneuver within which they can pursue their preferred policies (March and Olsen 1996) . Consequently, the distribution of authority among regulatory agencies in regard to a specific issue may have an impact on regulatory outcomes. Moreover, institutional structures may vary in the extent to which they provide access to particular interest groups (Hall and Taylor 1996, Caduff 2001) . They may offer privileged access to some interest groups at the expense of others, thus affecting political influence and ultimately regulatory outcomes (Kitschelt 1986 ).
This explanatory framework contributes to theorizing on comparative biotechnology policy in four ways. First, it goes beyond the most popular explanation, which views regulatory differences as a direct result of variation in public attitudes (Chen and McDermott 1998) . Second, it departs from explanations that concentrate on "unique" factors, such as political culture and regulatory style (Vogel 2001 , Vogel 1996 , Jasanoff 1995 , Echols 1998 . Third, it focuses on the analysis of causal hypotheses rather than the description of policy networks (see e.g. Moore 2000a). Fourth, it provides an explanation for empirical deviations from the conventional economic theory of regulation (see, e.g., Baron 2000 , Stigler 1971 ).
Environmental and Consumer Group Influence
The starting point of a theoretical answer to why regulatory outcomes may deviate from the outcome predicted by Stigler's (1971) producer dominance argument can be derived from Olson's 'Logic of Collective Action' (Olson 1965) . 5 Olson hypothesized that large (latent) groups are difficult to mobilize. He claimed that such groups could only be mobilized through selective incentives of an economic or social type.
We pick up at this point and assume that environmental and consumer interest groups are aware of their collective action problem and thus focus largely on issues that allow for maximum mobilization of membership and financial resources. Issues that provoke public outrage are top candidates. Public outrage is the fear or anger a risk induces in a relatively large part of a country's population. Its extent depends in part on specific characteristics of a given risk. Public outrage is stronger the more the risk in question is perceived to be involuntary, uncontrollable, or invisible, has a delayed or catastrophic effect, is memorable, very uncertain, poorly understood, unfamiliar, unfairly distributed, and a technological hazard (Groth 1994 , Wohl 1998 . Public outrage over risks with these properties tends to be even stronger in cases where less risky alternatives exist. Contextual factors like distrust of government agencies regulating the risk determine the extent of public outrage as well.
Public outrage increases environmental/consumer groups' capacity to influence the regulatory process through politics and the market. The underlying logic is the following. Consumer and environmental organizations are pressure groups that offer a public good, i.e. consumer or environmental protection. Public choice theory tells us that the production of public goods is plagued by a freerider problem: anyone can benefit from a public good promoted by a pressure group without joining or in other ways actively supporting the group. In addition, consumer or environmental groups involve large numbers of people, which increases the free-rider problem and the heterogeneity of preferences. Free-riding and heterogeneity of preferences reduce the organizational ability of interest groups. Focusing on issues with a high public outrage potential enables environmental/consumer groups to activate existing members, receive attention by the media, attract more members, mobilize non-members (latent supporters of a cause), and raise more funds (Frey and Kirchgässner 1994, Marwell and Oliver 1993) . It thus redistributes political influence from industry to environmental and consumer groups. Once environmental/consumer groups have overcome their collective action problem, their liability of large numbers turns into an asset: by virtue of their large membership, they can exert substantial political influence on vote-maximizing politicians and budget-or political support-maximizing regulators since consumers are also voters.
The second effect of public outrage operates through the market. If public outrage is strong enough to significantly raise environmental or consumer groups' collective action capacity they can take more effective action against producers. They can, for example, boycott specific products, firms, or even entire industries, and launch public campaigns aiming at tarnishing the image of firms, industries, and products (Friedman 1991) . Through such action, environmental/consumer groups can bring about changes in producers' preferences and behavior in the market place, with evident implications for regulatory processes. Through these two effects public outrage can contribute to regulatory outcomes that reflect consumer/environmental instead of industry preferences.
Public outrage does not only vary across issues, but also across countries and over time. The case studies below show that variation in public outrage across the EU and the United States accounts in part for variation in the collective action capacity of the respective environmental/consumer groups and their influence on the regulatory process.
Producer Influence
The conventional political economy model of regulation holds that stricter environmental or consumer protection standards will be enacted if producers can benefit economically from the according regulation. Stricter regulation can yield several types of benefits to producers.
First, protectionist rents. Environmental or consumer protection will tend towards greater stringency particularly in areas where regulation can be designed to shield import-competing domestic firms from foreign competition. The assumption here is that producer demands for import-restricting regulation are likely to attract more political support if justified in terms of protecting public health, rather than in terms of protecting domestic firms. The latter is more difficult to justify because it transfers wealth from domestic consumers to domestic producers. 6 Second, domestic economic rents. Similar to the argument on protectionist rents, this argument assumes that firms' interests are shaped by industrial structure and that firms seek to improve their competitive position through regulation. However, it differs from the above argument in several ways. In contrast to the classical regulatory capture argument (Stigler 1971 , Baron 2000 , it does not assume that there is a single industry with homogeneous interests within a given country. Individual firms or groups of firms within a specific industry may lobby for stricter or laxer, and for harmonized or particularistic regulations, depending on industrial structure and competitive position. For example, some large firms may lobby for stricter environmental or consumer regulations that would be too costly for smaller firms to implement, while smaller firms within the same industry and the same country oppose them (Foster 2001) .
Situations in which firms lobby for more stringent environmental or consumer regulations that have the "side-effect" of limiting market access by foreign or other domestic producers can, in some cases, coincide with similar demands by environmental or consumer groups. Such "strange bedfellow" coalitions tend to drive environmental and consumer protection standards up. When explaining regulatory outcomes in terms of producer interests we also need to take into account different producer interests within the same issue area and the same country.
Third, as proposed in the previous subsection, public outrage and associated campaigns by environmental and consumer groups can influence interests on the producer side very directly. Depending again on industrial structure and competitive position, individual firms or groups of firms within a given industry may decide to give in to such pressure and support or tolerate stricter environmental or consumer regulations, or they may not. Some producers in a given industry may be more sensitive to consumer pressure than other producers, for example, because they have a valuable brand to protect.
GMO Policy of the European Union
6 Several authors have proposed a further differentiation of this argument by distinguishing between regulations focusing on the quality of products and regulations focusing on production processes. They claim that product regulations are easier to instrumentalize for protectionist purposes than process regulations. Consequently, product regulations, on average, tend to be more stringent than process regulations and also vary more across countries. In many empirical cases, including GMOs, a straightforward distinction of product and process regulations is difficult. But the underlying argument of protectionist interests can be employed in a broader fashion. See Murphy 1995 , Scharpf 1998 In this case study we first describe regulatory outcomes in the European Union. We then explain the emergence of strict approval and labeling regulations in terms of the collective action capacity of consumer and producer interests.
Regulations
At the outset of the regulatory process in the mid-1980s, authorities in the EU and the United States were divided over whether to restrict or promote biotechnology in agriculture, and over whether to regulate genetically modified organisms (GMOs) predominantly in terms of products or production processes. 7 Regulating products implies that there is nothing inherently unique in employing genetic modification techniques in agriculture, and that the resulting products are essentially the same as products obtained through conventional agricultural methods. Regulating production processes, on the other hand, implies that genetic modification poses unique risks and must, as such, be regulated. The latter approach has prevailed in the EU: the EU has adopted a variety of regulations specifically for GMOs, emphasizing the precautionary principle. As shown in the second case study, the United States has embraced the product-oriented approach.
In 1990, the European Council adopted Directive 90/220 on the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into the environment.
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While this directive was primarily designed to address environmental aspects of biotechnology 9 , it was, until the Novel Foods Regulation was adopted in 1997 (see below), interpreted broadly to apply also to the approval of GM-food products (Chen and McDermott 1998) . Complicated decision-making procedures 10 implied, however, that imports of GM-seeds, field trials, commercial planting of , and commercialization of GM food and feed products were, de facto, subject to approval by each EU member state. 12 7 The early years of biotech regulation in the EU are well described in Patterson 2000; and Cantley 1995. 8 Other EU legislation relevant to GMOs has, for example, focused on worker health and safety protection (90/679 and 93/88), and the contained use of GMOs for commercial and research purposes. All EU legislation on GMOs is available at www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex 9 Whereas part B of directive 90/220 regulates the release of such organisms into the environment for purposes of research and development, part C covers the approval of GMOs or products containing GMOs for commercialization in the EU. 10 According to directive 90/220, producers or importers of a GM-product first have to notify the national authority of the EU country concerned and provide technical documentation and a full risk assessment. If the national authority approves the GM-product, the request moves to the EU level, where the other 14 member states are consulted. If there are no objections, the GM-product is approved for sale in the EU. If there is opposition, the issue is dealt with by the EU's Scientific Committee, the Commission, and the EU's Regulatory Committee. If there is still no agreement, the issue is decided by the Council of Ministers with qualified majority. 11 GM-crops can be listed in a EU catalogue of common varieties that are approved for EU-wide planting. No GM-crops have so far been listed in that catalogue. 12 www.transgen.de.
The limitations of the 1990 directive became apparent when the Competent Authorities of the EU 13 approved a British firm's GM-canola (1995), a variety of Bt-corn produced by Novartis (1996) , and Monsanto's Roundup Ready soybeans (1996) . Disputes among EU member countries over the conditions for approval led to delays in the approval process, and to uneven implementation of EU decisions. In particular, some EU countries imposed unilateral restrictions or bans on GM-products that had been approved by the EU.
Since April 1998, there has been a de facto moratorium on new approvals. 14 Only the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the EU Commission have opposed a formal moratorium, all other member states have supported the moratorium.
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Facing disarray in the approval process and the fact that several GM-products had, by 1997, already been approved by the EU for commercialization the European Union engaged in further efforts to harmonize approval and labeling requirements for GMOs.
In 1997 the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation 258/97, the Novel Foods Regulation, which also covers GM-foods. It installs approval procedures in which importers or producers have to show that the food in question is not detrimental to human health. Although the regulation does require labeling if a genetic modification can be detected, virtually all enzymes, vitamines, flavorings and other food additives were exempt from the regulation (Jany and Greiner 1998, Gately 1997) .
Regulation 258/97 as such was largely inoperable. It did not contain specifics on implementation and it was left to individual member states to define thresholds, testing methods, products subject to testing, and the content of labels. The regulation did not apply to granted or pending approvals (Behrens et al. 1997 ). Bt-corn and Roundup Ready soybeans, which had been approved by the EU in 1996, were thus not covered by 258/97. As noted before, the latter regulation also excluded enzymes, vitamins, flavorings, and other food additives (e.g. lecithin produced from GM soy). These gaps motivated some EU countries to introduce their own labeling regulations, a development which risked inhibiting the free flow of goods in the Community (Chege 1998 ).
To stop this trend, the Commission and the Council issued several additional regulations. Regulations 1813/97 and 1139/98 require the labeling of food products containing already approved GM-soybeans and GM-corn, but did not close the other gaps (Robert-Koch-Institut 1999, Jany and Greiner 1998) . In January 2000, the Commission defined a standard (49/2000) by which labeling is required if the product is at least 1 percent genetically modified. For such products, the label "genetically modified" is mandatory. Regulation 50/2000 extends the labeling requirement to food ingredients containing GM-additives and flavorings if GMOs can be detected. Thus, a comprehensive labeling scheme has been constructed in recent years.
In February 2001, the EU Council and the European Parliament reached a compromise on revisions to Directive 220/90. These revisions include timelimits on approval (maximum 10 years), explicit procedures and schedules for each stage of the approval process, public registers detailing the locations of GMOs released for trial or commercialization, stricter guidelines for risk assessment, the gradual elimination of antibiotic resistance markers in GMOs, and calls for new and stricter legislation on traceability, liability, and labeling. These regulatory reforms, a large part of which are still at the stage of proposals and plans, are to cover the entire production chain of all foods and feeds produced with biotechnology, even if no GMOs are detectable in the final product.
In July 2001, the Commission proposed a new law specifically for GM-food and feed. The draft proposal includes significantly more restrictive requirements for the approval of GM-food and for labeling. The draft proposes extensive safety assessments for all products without the application of the principle of substantial equivalence. It also foresees the extension of labeling to all products produced by biotechnology even if not traceable in the end product.
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In summary, the European Union has moved from a situation of no regulation of agricultural biotechnology in the mid-1980s to very stringent regulations on the approval of GM-crops and GM-foods, and to increasingly stringent and harmonized labeling requirements. As a result, very few GM-crops and GMfoods have been approved for commercialization, the number of field trials has remained low, and virtually no GM-crops are commercially grown in the EU. Moreover, there are extremely few labeled GM-products on the European market.
Explanation
While some analysts had already in the early-to mid-1990s warned of growing opposition to agricultural biotechnology (Frewer 1997) , no one anticipated the coming upheaval that would virtually shut down the EU's market for GM-crops and GM-foods. Ex post, the strong trend towards stricter GMO regulations in the EU can be explained in terms of an increasingly broad and influential anti-GMO coalition. This coalition includes environmental and consumer groups, some farmers, many downstream producers, and important parts of the EU's regulatory institutions.
Environmental and consumer interests
The theoretical argument holds that environmental/consumer groups under certain circumstances exert influence through the market in a way that affects consumption behavior and thus ultimately also producers, e.g. by launching campaigns or organizing boycotts against specific producers or industries. Their influence can also operate through the political process in terms of lobbying of policy-makers and voter support for specific policy-makers and their policies. The latter is discussed in this subsection. Market pressure is examined in the subsection on producers.
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth Europe (FOE), the largest environmental interest groups in Europe, have made GMOs one of their top priorities since the end of the 1980s and have ever since invested heavily in campaigns. The same applies to the European Bureau of Consumers' Unions (BEUC), a Brusselsbased federation of independent national consumer organizations from all EU and other European countries. While BEUC has lobbied mainly for stricter labeling of GM-foods, Greenpeace and FOE have taken stronger anti-GMO positions. All three groups, as well as many other environmental/consumer groups in Europe 17 have persistently and sharply exposed and criticized inadequacies in the EU's GMO regulations and their implementation (BEUC 1999; Egdell and Thomson 1999) .
Benefiting from latent public skepticism about technological innovation in agriculture, various food scandals particularly in the 1990s, and low public trust in regulatory agencies, NGOs were able to provoke a public outcry over the EU's authorization of Roundup Ready soybeans in May 1996 and Bt-corn in December 1996. This outcry over the imminent placing of GM-food on shelves in supermarkets helped NGOs to mobilize their membership and the wider public against GMOs and to launch major anti-GMO campaigns against producers. Thus, the 1996 authorizations acted as a trigger for NGOs anti-GMO campaigns. Comparisons of survey data across time show that consumer acceptance of biotechnology in the EU was lower than in the United States even before 1996 (Hoban 1997) , and declined substantially in the second half of the 1990s (Eurobarometer 2000) . Attitudes appear to be driven by moral considerations, fears about unforeseen health and environmental risks, and the perception of GM-products as "unnatural" (Eurobarometer 2000) . Most European consumers view the GMO issue in health and safety terms rather than in terms of progress in science and technology, and general views on GM-foods are predominantly negative.
Though NGOs were not at the negotiating table when GMO regulations were designed and adopted, one can spot their influence at several key points in the regulatory process. In the second half of the 1980s, the EU's Directorate General for Environment, Consumer Protection, and Nuclear Safety (DG XI) emerged as the leading agency for the regulation of GMOs. DG XI, whose "constituency" includes environmental/consumer NGOs, was mainly responsible for establishing the process-orientation of the EU's GMO policy, which is reflected in Directive 90/220. DG XI's role as "chef de file" for that directive opened an important door for environmental/consumer NGO influence on the EU's regulatory policy, not least because most regulatory activity is initiated by the Commission.
18
The leading role of DG XI and the influence of NGOs were in large measure responsible for moving the EU's GMO policy from a system of monitored self-regulation towards process-oriented regulations grounded in the precautionary principle and following the model of Danish and German policies (Patterson 2000) .
The opportunities for environmental/consumer groups to influence the EU's regulatory policy increased further when the 1986 Single European Act, the 1993 Maastricht treaty, and the 1997 Amsterdam Agreement strengthened the European Parliament (EP). The EP, eager to ascertain de facto its formally expanding authority, has been particularly open to NGO influence (Biliouri 1999 , Barling 1995 , Young 1997 . Motivated in large part by NGO lobbying, the EP has repeatedly and successfully challenged proposals by the European Commission and the Council of Ministers that would have led to a relaxation of approval and labeling regulations (see Barling 1995 : 469, Patterson 2000 , Behrens, Meyer-Stumborg, and Simonis 1997 , Jany and Greiner 1998 . Similarly, the NGO-led public outcry over the Commission's approval of GMsoy and GM-corn in 1996 and its initial decision not to require labeling of these products strengthened the position of DG XI within the Commission. Strong opposition by environmental/consumer groups combined with resistance on the part of downstream producers (see below) enabled DG XI to make a more stringent technical adaptation to Directive 90/220 in June 1997. This adaptation required mandatory labeling for all "live" GMOs (e.g. cereals) but does not apply to products that may contain GMOs or GMO derivatives.
NGO campaigns have influenced the regulatory process also in more indirect but important ways by contributing to a "ratcheting up" effect. In 1986-1998, for example, they motivated some EU countries to introduce mandatory labeling for GM-soy and GM-corn in the absence of EU-wide legislation.
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They have also contributed to preventing the marketing of EU approved GMOs in several EU countries.
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Such differences in regulatory responses by individual EU countries 18 The Novel Foods Regulation, for example, was discussed in an "Expert Working Group" (member states only), the Foodstuff Advisory Committee (agricultural interests -COPA, retailers -EuroCommerce, producers -CIAA, consumers -BEUC, and trade interests), and the Consumer Consultative Committee (Behrens, MeyerStumborg, and Simonis 1997) . 19 For example, Denmark required full disclosure of any GMO ingredient, whereas the United Kingdom did not require labeling of substantially equivalent foods. 20 For example, Austria, Italy, and Luxembourg invoked the safeguard clause in 90/220 to ban the import of Bt corn into their countries. In another case, the French government first prohibited the cultivation of Bt-corn, have been perceived by the Commission and other EU bodies as constraints on the free movement of goods in the EU's internal market. Like in other EU policy areas, EU-wide harmonization of regulations has been the obvious response to this problem. Member countries with more stringent regulations have, not least because of strong NGO and general domestic consumer opposition, not been willing to relax their policies. Even in cases where such regulations are incompatible with EU-legislation, the Commission has been very reluctant to challenge them, for example through the European Court of Justice. The only feasible solution has thus been harmonization at levels of stringency supported by more GMO-adverse countries.
Producers
Persistently negative public perceptions of GMOs and concerted anti-GMO campaigns by NGOs have created a rift in the coalition of up-and downstream producers and farmers. Some farm interest groups and downstream producers started supporting more stringent GMO regulations while agbiotech firms maintained their opposition until the late 1990s. Towards the end of the 1990s upstream producers too gave up their resistance and began to accept mandatory labeling.
Upstream Producers. Concerned about growing cross-national differences in regulation, the agrochemical, pharmaceutical, and food industries in the EU argued already in the mid-1980s that there was a need for EU-wide regulation of biotechnology (Patterson 2000: 329) . Surprisingly though, such statements were, in the early phases of the policy process, not accompanied by more concrete initiatives.
Biotechnology (SAGB). 21
Moreover, upstream producers expected GMO regulations to promote biotechnology as originally intended by the Commission. Directive 90/220, however, has put the EU on a trajectory where GMOregulations have in effect installed floor standards for environmental and consumer protection.
The above explanation focusing on the timing of the industry's political organization accounts rather well for why upstream producers were not able to prevent Directive 90/220. It does not explain, however, why upstream producers have not been able to reverse the regulatory trajectory initiated in 1990. Although the subsequent regulatory developments can in part be explained by the path dependency of the EU's regulatory system, this explanation is too vague to account for why over and over again regulations were adopted that were contrary to the industry's interest. The theoretical argument outlined above provides the missing link.
Market concentration in the agbiotech sector is rather high in Europe. There are only a small number of large firms and these have concentrated on medical rather than agricultural applications (Assouline 1996, Chen and McDermott 1998) . The conventional economic theory of regulation suggests that this concentration should bolster European upstream producers' collective action capacity and translate into successful lobbying for less restrictive GMO regulations. However, the evidence disconfirms this proposition.
Activists from Greenpeace and FOE, as well as many smaller groups, have engaged in a large number of media-effective anti-GMO activities, for example uprooting of GM-crop fields, attempts to prevent the unloading of ships carrying U.S. GM-crops, and campaigns against leading agbiotech firms.
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Persistently negative public perceptions of GMOs and campaigns by NGOs have neutralized virtually every attempt by European biotech firms and EuropaBio, the European Association of Bioindustries, to lobby for a relaxation of approval regulations and to prevent the introduction of mandatory labeling (Jasanoff 1999) .
NGO campaigns against large agbiotech firms have been particularly effective in inflicting reputation costs on upstream producers. These campaigns have turned large agbiotech firms into a highly visible target onto which the wider public has been able to project GMO-related fears, but also more diffuse fears about globalization, technological innovation, and U.S. dominance over Europe. With slogans such as "Monsanto is trying to force-feed Frankensteinfood to Europeans", activist groups have portrayed GMOs as a risk imposed on Europeans by American firms. The United States has inadvertently helped such campaigns by trying to pressure the EU into lifting its ban on growth hormones used in beef production (Caduff 2001) . Similar to the growth hormones case, U.S. pressure on the EU to relax its restrictions on GMOs has been widely perceived in Europe as an effort to impose, for commercial reasons and against the will of Europe's consumers, a new and risky agricultural technology. Social science research on risk suggests that people are more willing to accept risks imposed by nature, but are likely to be more upset when forced to take manmade risks (Harlander 1991 , Covello et al. 1991 .
Monsanto, Novartis, Rhone-Poulenc, AgrEvo/Aventis, Zeneca, and other agbiotech firms have found it extremely difficult to defend against this onslaught.
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Most European biotech firms as well as EuropaBio eventually changed their position and have reluctantly supported mandatory labeling.
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Permissive approval regulations and no mandatory labeling would have been their preferred outcome. But in view of strong consumer concerns over GMOs, stern opposition by NGOs, and increasingly heterogeneous regulatory responses by individual EU countries, stricter and harmonized labeling regulations appeared to be the only way of protecting agbiotech interests.
Agricultural Producers. Assuming large economies of scale in GM-crop farming, which would give U.S. farms a comparative advantage vis-à-vis on average smaller European farms, some analysts predicted fierce opposition by EU farm interests to the introduction of GMOs McDermott 1998, Lynch and Vogel 2000) . From this assumption, they have jumped to the conclusion that EU restrictions on GMOs are the result of an "unholy alliance" between protectionist farm interests and environmental/consumer groups. The evidence does not support this argument.
Farm interest groups in the EU, most notably the European Farmers' Coordination, have until the late 1990s repeatedly expressed concerns about GM-crops, but have not actively lobbied regulators to impose restrictions. The absence of substantial opposition by key European farm interest groups was largely due to the fact that there was no direct economic competition between imported GM-crops and European farm produce.
Imports of soybeans and corn from the United States have, since the mid-1990s, declined, in large part due to regulatory restrictions. However, imports of these crops from other non-EU countries as well as total EU imports of soybeans and, to a lesser extent, also corn have increased at the same time (ACGA 2000 , Feedstuffs 1999 ).
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The EU is largely self-sufficient in corn, whereas EU production of soybeans amounts to less than 10 percent of domestic 23 Monsanto, for example, invested more than two million U.S.D in a campaign in the United Kingdom and France, only to find out that negative opinions about GMO increased from 44 to 51% in that time-period (Financial Times 1997, October 23: 3; Wall Street Journal 1999, May 11: A1, A10; New York Times 2001, January 25 and Business Week, June 12, 2000 for analyses of the Monsanto case). 24 EuropaBio, for example, stated that it "[...] supports the right of the consumer to choose food products with or without GM (genetically modified) ingredients. Consumer choice must be supported by appropriate transparent legislation, i.e. clear guidelines and criteria for labelling" (EuropaBio 1999b). 25 For example, between 1996 and 1999, the EU's soybean imports rose from 14.3 million MT to 16.6 million MT. In that same time-period, the EU's corn imports rose from 9.6 million MT to 11 million MT (Dann 2000) .
consumption. Because most of the corn and soy consumed in the EU is used for animal feed, premiums for imported non-GM-soy and, to a much lesser extent, corn may even have imposed costs on EU farmers. In other words, the EU's GMO-regulations have, de facto, not improved the competitive position of EU farmers vis-a-vis their U.S. counterparts.
More active support by EU farm interest groups since the late 1990s for more restrictive GMO regulations stems primarily from general concerns about disturbances in European food markets. These problems have resulted from the BSE and other food safety crises (Egdell and Thomson 1999, Cummins 1998 ), but also from more general problems associated with food surpluses and massive restructuring and concentration processes in European agriculture. In this context, support for stringent GMO-regulations, and in some cases even explicit support by farmers for anti-GMO campaigns by NGOs, must been viewed as part of an overall effort to reduce consumer concerns and stabilize markets by means of stricter food safety regulations across the board (Vos 2000) . Anti-GMO views among EU farmers have also been fueled by Monsanto's strategy of market entry -notably its purchase of seed companies and the introduction of the "terminator" gene -and the imposition of trade measures by the U.S. against EU agricultural products in the trade conflict over growth hormones.
Increasingly negative views on GMOs among farmers in the EU have been reinforced by cases in several EU countries where fields were accidentally planted with GMO-contaminated crops.
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NGOs and farmers have accused governments of being incapable of ascertaining that imported seeds are GMOfree. More generally, and similar to the BSE crisis, these cases have reinforced the view among consumers and also farmers that governments have lost control in food safety matters. In most of these cases, GMO-contaminated crops were destroyed and farmers were compensated by the respective government, an implicit acknowledgement of their problems in controlling seed imports.
Although opposition to GMOs by EU farmers has so far clearly not been motivated by protectionist rent-seeking, it seems likely that this motivation will arise once other GM-products with more direct competitive effects on EU farmers enter the world market on a larger scale (e.g. wheat, rice, fruit, fish, meat). European farmers thus seem to be set on a trajectory towards greater opposition to GMOs. If in future the competitiveness issue dominates over the issue of consumer confidence, stricter labeling regulations will not solve the problem for EU farmers. In that case, farmers will lobby more strongly for an outright ban on GM-crops and GM-foods.
Downstream Producers. Food processors, wholesalers, and retailers in the EU initially tried to resist demands for mandatory labeling. Since 1996, however, they have adjusted swiftly to the demands of environmental/consumer groups.
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While most downstream producers have, in principle, not opposed GMproducts, they have given in to market pressure and have accepted demands for segregation, tracing, and labeling.
The first to adjust were large food processors worried about their valuable brands. In 1997, Nestlé, a Swiss company that was initially opposed to GM-food labeling, began to label its GM-products in Europe voluntarily (European Report 1997 , Food Labeling News 1998a . 28 Unilever, a company based in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, that used around 7.5 percent of all soybeans imported into the EU, did the same in 1998 (Food Labeling News 1998a). At that point in time, Nestlé was the world's largest food processor, Unilever the third largest (RAFI Communique 1998). Both firms justified labeling with consumers' right to know but emphasized that GM-foods did not pose any health risks. Many other food processors have followed these examples since.
Similar to what we observed for upstream producers, changes in the positions of food processors have also been prompted by concerns over increasing differences in the regulatory policies of individual EU countries. These differences threatened to reduce the advantages of large food processors in terms of their economies of scale. Concerns of this nature have also been expressed by the Confederation of Food and Drink Industries (CIAA), the most important association of the food and drink industry in the EU (Egdell and Thomson 1999: 124) .
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Food processors have thus come to prefer stricter but uniform labeling and approval regulations over permissive regulations.
The downstream industry's strategy of differentiating products along GMO/non-GMO lines and stopping the anti-GMO trend half way by accepting labeling has largely failed. Even before official labeling regulations were adopted downstream producers started labeling a variety of GM-foods. Market analysts note that these labels did apparently not deter consumers. However, NGOs then singled out labeled products, such as Nestlé's "butterfinger", for massive public campaigns. In response, retailers and wholesalers withdrew these products and producers upstream reduced or halted their production of these foods. Pressure on downstream producers has grown further due to the increasing amount of testing for undeclared GMOs by NGOs and public authorities that has gone hand in hand with increasingly precise and decreasingly costly testing methods (Millstone 2000) . In the end, downstream producers' support for labeling produced a "Catch-22" situation: if they labeled a GM-product, they were attacked by NGOs and were forced to withdraw the product; if they did not label a GM-product, they risked NGO campaigns plus legal action for violation of EU or national regulations. Thus, under fierce pressure from NGOs labeled GMfoods have gradually disappeared from the market.
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Conclusion
Until the mid-1980s, the biotechnology policy of the European Union was very similar to that of other OECD countries. Contrary to the U.S., however, the EU has adopted and implemented a series of increasingly stringent approval and labeling regulations since 1990. As a result, very few GMOs have been approved by the EU for marketing as food or feed, virtually none for commercial planting, and the number of labeled GM-food products on the market has approached zero.
The theoretical framework outlined above helps in accounting for this trend. Benefiting from growing consumer concerns over agricultural biotechnology, food safety problems in the EU, and low public trust in regulatory authorities, European environmental/consumer groups were able to effectively mobilize their supporters and the wider public. They were thus able to launch powerful campaigns against upstream and downstream producers. These campaigns have also transformed the GMO issue into one of "high saliency" and (in the eyes of the wider public) "low complexity" -which usually produces "hearing room" patterns of policy-making (Gormley 1986 ). This hearing room pattern, combined with the multi-level nature of EU policy-making, has opened the door for NGO influence. NGOs have thus been able to influence directly not only the behavior of producers (market pressure), but also regulatory decision-making, predominantly via the European Parliament and the Commission's DG XI.
Public concerns over GM-foods in combination with NGO campaigns have divided producers, thus reducing their collective action capacity in ways not anticipated by conventional economic theories of regulation. Large upstream producers, such as Monsanto and Novartis, became prime targets of NGO action and were never able to put up effective resistance.
Farmers, concerned primarily about major disturbances in European food markets, have increasingly turned against GMOs. Their opposition is likely to grow further if GM-products with direct effects on their competitive position appear on the EU's market. Because labeling can not solve their competitiveness 30 Since 2000, many large food processors, wholesalers, and retailers in the EU have moved even further against GMOs by restricting their meat supply to animals raised on non-GMO feed. Even McDonalds UK and major retailers in the United Kingdom, so far the EU country with the most GMO friendly policy, have changed sides, making it ever more likely that European markets are definitively turning against GMOs (Organic Newsline 2001, February 1).
problem, European farmers are likely to become increasingly strong advocates of a general ban on GMOs.
Downstream producers embraced labeling due to public risk aversion and increasing NGO pressure. This change in the producer coalition exposed GMfoods to even more pressure by NGOs and forced downstream producers to desert the market for labeled GM-foods. The resulting cost implications for downstream producers vary across GM-products. While substitutes for GM-corn have been easy to find, premiums for non-GM soy have risen because very few countries supply the world market for soy. Most of these countries are major producers of GM-soy. Nonetheless, given their low collective action capacity due to their large number and very diverse interests, strong NGO opposition and public risk aversion, downstream producers are unlikely to reverse their position and try and re-establish a market for GM-foods.
The combination of low public acceptance of GM-foods, NGO pressure, growing opposition against GMOs among farmers, strong incentives of downstream producers to withdraw from the market for labeled GM-foods, and institutional inertia in EU policy-making make a reversal of the regulatory trend against GMOs in the European Union very unlikely. On the contrary, mandatory labeling is a solution for those consumer concerns that center on information asymmetry, but not a solution for consumer concerns centered on risk shielding. Moreover, compulsory labeling does not solve problems of agricultural excess capacity and inferior competitiveness of European farmers on a global scale. Mandatory labeling may thus be only an intermediary step on the way to complete closure of the EU's market to GMOs.
GMO Policy of the United States
Regulations
In the early to mid-1980s different parts of the U.S. government, in particular EPA, USDA, and FDA, struggled for regulatory authority in biotechnology policy. Similar to Europe, they were divided over whether to restrict or promote this new technology, and whether to adopt a product-or process-oriented approach to regulation. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), USDA, and FDA preferred the promotion of biotechnology and a product-approach, whereas EPA advocated the development of new risk assessment procedures for GMOs and process-based regulation (Jasanoff 1995) .
In 1984, responding to increasing criticism, notably by industry, of lacking coordination in biotech policy, the Executive Office of the U.S. President created a Cabinet Council Working Group with representatives from fifteen agencies. By taking this step, the Reagan administration prevented a takeover of regulatory authority by the EPA 31 , more active involvement of the U.S. Congress, and more public scrutiny of the regulatory process in general (Holla 1995) .
In 1986, this working group issued a Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology. The Coordinated Framework firmly established the productorientation of U.S. biotech policy and denied the necessity of new legislation specifically for GMOs. It locked in the prevailing assumption that commercial biotechnology should not be viewed as posing special risks for human health and the environment. It assigned the primary responsibility for regulation to EPA, USDA, and FDA, and established principles for coordination and cooperation among these authorities (Jasanoff 1995: 314) .
Transportation, growing (including field testing), and propagation of GM-crops are governed by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the USDA under the Federal Plant Pest Act. If a GM-plant is not intended for human consumption and is not modified to contain a pesticide the USDA is the leading agency. Pest-resistant GM-crops on the other hand fall under the authority of the EPA under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act. They are subject to a rather strict testing regime, where producers must submit testing data to the EPA. The FDA has regulatory authority for GM-foods, food additives, processing aids, and biotech medical products. It also has primary responsibility for labeling.
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Of the three agencies FDA has had the greatest influence on U.S. biotech policy because most biotech products on the U.S. market have been health care or food products McDermott 1998, Moore 2000a ). The FDA's approval procedure is based on consultations with producers and includes the submission of (not officially published) summaries of tests.
Both the USDA and the FDA have, throughout the 1990s, relaxed their GMO approval policies. In 1993, the APHIS introduced a notification (instead of permit) procedure for six transgenic crops (corn, soybean, cotton, tomato, potato, and tobacco).
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In 1997, it extended this notification policy to the majority of GM-crop varieties grown and used in the United States and greatly simplified notification procedures for imports, release into the environment, and transportation of GMOs.
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It has, moreover, removed an increasing number of GM-plants from its oversight. In 1994, in accordance with its 1992 31 In 1984, the EPA had proposed to regulate biotechnology under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act. 32 With the exception of meat and poultry products (governed by the USDA). 33 These crops were chosen because they had undergone the most extensive field-testing, and because none of these crops had wild relatives in the United States. 34 As a result of this relaxation of approval practices the number of field releases increased from 8 in 1987 to 1105 in 1998 (Lemaux 1998 Under this procedure, applications for approval of GM-foods do not have to undergo a comprehensive scientific review since GM-foods are considered to be "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS) (FDA 1994) . In essence, this system allows biotech firms to decide on their own whether a GMproduct is safe. The FDA is only consulted.
This strong product-orientation is also reflected in U.S. policy on labeling. GMfoods are subject to the same labeling requirements that are applied by the FDA to all foods on the U.S. market (Caswell 1998: 23-24) . Labeling is only mandatory if a particular GM-food is no longer substantially equivalent to the corresponding conventional food in terms of composition, nutrition, or safety.
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In 1992, the FDA ruled that if any of the most common allergens (milk, eggs, wheat, fish, crustacea, tree nuts and legumes, especially peanuts and soybeans) are added to food via biotechnology, the producer must either provide scientific evidence that the allergen is not present in the new food or label the product. Such products are subject to additional safety testing. The label does not have to indicate that the food was produced with biotechnology. It must only state that a potential allergen has been added to the food (FDA 1994) . The vast majority of GM-foods on the U.S. market thus do not require labeling.
The EPA has favored a more process-oriented approach to GMO regulation than the FDA and the USDA (Jasanoff 1995: 316-317) . In late 1994, it proposed a set of regulations for GM-plants designed to resist pests, treating such plants as if they were pesticides. Due to opposition from other parts of the U.S. government, industry, and scientists, the proposed rules were not adopted (Lemaux 1998) . In 1999, more intense public debate and NGO involvement in GMO issues was triggered by a research report suggesting that a particular variety of Bt-corn caused harm not only to pests (notably the corn borer), but also Monarch 35 Federal Register, May 29, 1992. In its 1992 policy statement, i.e. its interpretation of the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in regard to foods derived from new plant varieties, FDA stated that it would require GM-foods to meet the same rigorous standards as all other foods. It also announced that it would treat substances intentionally added to food through genetic engineering as food additives if they were significantly different in structure, function, or amount from substances currently in the food. (FDA 1994) The FDA thus ignored a 1991 proposal by the Environmental Defense Fund (now Environmental Defense) to apply the Food Additives Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to all biotech foods. Thus, technically, the FDA does not consider new genes and their protein products to be food additives. If regulated as food additives, such products would fall under section 409 of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which would force the FDA to use pre-market approval processes. In that case, producers would bear the responsibility (and costs) of evaluating the new products' safety (Krimsky and Wrubel 1996) . 36 The FLAVR SAVR TM tomato is designed to remain on the vine longer before being picked (it softens slower). In 1994, Calgene, the producer of the tomato, engaged in consultations with the FDA's Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN). Based on an evaluation of the data provided by Calgene, FDA determined that the tomato had not been significantly altered compared to other varieties of tomato. It was thus declared as safe as any other commonly consumed tomato. (Krimsky and Wrubel 1996; Martineau 2001:24-29) 37 For example: Higher than normal levels of lycopene, which can lower the risk of cancer or heart disease, would imply a change in composition. Higher levels of vitamin C would imply a change in nutritional value. The presence of a protein from peanuts in GM-food might imply the presence of a peanut allergen, and thus a change in safety. butterfly larvae.
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In response, the EPA has reexamined whether to subject certain GM-crops to pesticide regulations. In January 2000, it asked farmers using Bt-corn to plant buffer zones with conventional corn to protect the Monarch butterfly. 39 However, continuing opposition has thus far prevented the establishment of process-oriented GMO regulations beyond such ad hoc measures.
In parallel to increased public attention to the environmental consequences of GMOs a more intense public debate on labeling of GM-foods has developed. Opinion polls suggest that around 80 to 90 percent of U.S. respondents favor mandatory labeling of GM-foods (Bonior 1999 , Center for Science in the Public Interest 1998, NCBE 1999). Although recent surveys affirm this result they also found that the majority does not feel strongly about labeling. Since 1999 several political initiatives have been launched to introduce mandatory labeling. The FDA has, so far, remained largely immune to this pressure. In January 2001, it reaffirmed its product-oriented approach and submitted two proposals intended to strengthen its regulatory oversight. 42 First, it proposed to make hitherto voluntary consultation between GMO-producers and the FDA in the approval process mandatory (Chen and McDermott 1998: 532) . 43 This new measure would not, however, substantially change the FDA's permissive approval policy: all GM-foods or feeds marketed in the United States have already gone through the voluntary consultation program installed in 1994. 44 Second, the FDA proposed guidelines for voluntary labeling of GM-/non-GM foods, similar to the policy currently applied to organic and kosher foods. . 42 In November and December 1999, the FDA held public hearings on whether or not GMOs should be defined as food additives, which would require mandatory labeling, and on whether or not more stringent testing procedures should be required to ensure consumer safety. (FDA 2000; Neegaard 1999 ) An influential study by the National Academy of Science, published in May 2000, supported in principle the FDA's product-focus. However, it proposed three additional measures: long-term studies on risks posed by the consumption of GMfoods containing substances other than those already on the market; the adoption of the EPA's 1994 proposal for regulations on pest resistant GM-plants; regulation of GM-crops designed to resist viruses. The January 2001 FDA proposal reflects the proposals of the NAS rather than the results of the FDA's public hearings. 43 If formally adopted, food or feed developers will have to notify the FDA at least 120 days before a GM-food or animal feed is marketed. They will also have to provide information demonstrating that the product is as safe as its conventional counterpart. This measure would transform the existing voluntary consultation procedure into a mandatory and more transparent one. 44 GM foods on the U.S. market are tracked, for example, by the Union of Concerned Scientists (www.ucsusa.org). 45 www.fda.gov.
In summary, U.S. regulatory policy on GMOs has focused almost exclusively on products. It has operated within pre-existing legislation and generally assumes that genetic engineering per se does not pose a particular risk that requires specific regulation of this production method. Approval of new GM-crops and GM-foods by the USDA and the FDA respectively has been relatively swift and uncomplicated. The EPA has, on several occasions, proposed process-oriented regulations for pest-resistant GM-crops, but these proposals have not been adopted. The majority of U.S. consumers favor mandatory labeling of GMfoods, though consumer preferences in this regard appear to be rather weak. NGOs have taken legal action in pursuit of this cause, and two bills on labeling have been introduced in Congress. So far, the FDA has not given in to these demands. It has maintained its permissive approval and no-labeling policy.
Explanation
In this section we account for the lax GMO approval regulations and the absence of mandatory labeling of GM-foods in the United States in terms of the theoretical argument outlined above. Permissive regulations have been installed and sustained in the United States under the influence of a broad and cohesive pro-GMO coalition. This coalition comprises the large majority of upstream and downstream producers as well as farmers. Anti-GMO lobbying on the part of environmental and consumer groups has remained rather weak.
Environmental and Consumer Groups
Only since the late 1990s have U.S. environmental/consumer groups lobbied on a larger scale for mandatory labeling of GM-foods and stricter environmental and health risk assessment in the approval process (Moore 2000b). 46 This timelag, compared to the EU, is surprising, notably because it is hard to explain in terms of lesser openness of the U.S. regulatory system. The U.S. approval process provides several public intervention points 47 and allows for just as much access by NGOs as the approval process in the EU.
In comparison to Europe, the proportion of U.S. NGOs not fundamentally opposed to GMOs is much larger. Consumers Union, for example, the largest U.S. consumer interest group, has advocated mandatory labeling but has not questioned the safety of agricultural biotechnology as such (Moore 2000a , Moore 2000b ). The same holds for the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and 46 Turning points are marked by the cloning of a sheep in 1997 and the discovery in 1999 that Bt-corn may not kill not only pests but also the Monarch Butterfly (Nature 1999, May). The latter quickly became a symbol for the environmental risks associated with GM-crops. 47 These include the Biosafety Committee review according to U.S. National Institutes of Health Guidelines; USDA determination of non-regulatory status (permission to grow, test, and use for traditional crop breeding without further U.S.DA action); EPA experimental use permit approval; EPA determination of food tolerance or exemption from tolerance; EPA product registration; FDA review process. (See www.consumeralert.org: Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology in the United States: How the Process Works) the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), both of which are among the few NGOs active in biotech issues already since the mid-1980s (Moore 2000b) . The Center for Science in the Public Interest, another important U.S. consumer NGO, has been largely supportive of GMOs.
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In contrast to Europe, most NGO activity on GMOs in the United States has consisted of lobbying of policymakers on the basis of scientific arguments, and lawsuits against regulatory agencies and individual biotech firms. Fundamental opposition to GMOs has remained in the realm of smaller and more radical NGOs.
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Compared to Europe, more "hands-on" NGO activity, such as demonstrations or destruction of GM-crops, has remained relatively rare. As discussed in the European case study, U.S. consumers view GM-foods more favorably than European consumers.
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Public support for all applications of biotechnology has remained at rather high levels over time.
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Nonetheless, as reported above, a majority of U.S. consumers appear to support mandatory labeling and NGO activity concerning the labeling issue has increased. Both developments combined have, in the late 1990s, begun to influence regulatory policy and the behavior of producers. We discuss the former at this point and examine the latter in the subsection on producers.
Biotech policy in the United States has, until very recently, been shaped almost entirely by the scientific community, industry, and the three U.S. government agencies responsible for regulation (USDA, FDA, EPA) (Moore 2000b) . NGOs have, for example, not been substantially involved in the development of the FDA's approval and labeling policy for GMOs. While NGOs began to lobby for mandatory labeling and stricter environmental risk assessment already in the late 1990s, NGO activity has been boosted by the StarLink problem, which emerged in September 2000.
Because StarLink corn contains a protein (Cry9C) that may cause allergic reactions it had been approved by the EPA only for animal feed, but not for 48 www.cspi.org. 49 E.g. Jeremy Rifkin from the Foundation on Economic Trends. 50 Only three percent of respondents mentioned biotechnology or GM-foods when asked what food safety issues they were most concerned about. No one mentioned biotechnology or GM-foods when asked what, over the past few months, they had been avoiding or eating less of. Only five percent stated that, during the past few months, they had done something or taken any action because of concerns over GM-foods. (GMA 2000) . 51 General consumer acceptance of plant biotechnology has remained approximately constant and high compared to Europe: survey results from 1992, 1994, and 1998 show constant support from 70 percent of surveyed Americans (Hoban 1998: 4) . Survey results reported in Priest (Priest 2000) and Hoban/Miller (Hoban and Miller 1998) show that between 1998 and 2000 support for human genetic screening increased from 70 to 84 percent, for new human medicines it declined from 80 to 79 percent, for insect protected crops it increased from 66 to 71 percent, for improved foods it increased from 58 to 60 percent (percentage of respondents agreeing that the respective application should be encouraged). The percentage of respondents stating that particular biotech applications were unacceptable was 21 percent for human medicines, 27 for insect protected crops, 37 for lower fat foods, 39 for disease resistant animals, and 57 for faster growing fish. See also the Wirthlin Worldwide survey on food biotechnology, www.ificinfo.health.org. Surveys reported in Nature Biotechnology, Vol.18, Sept. 2000:939-942 and a compilation of various survey results by the Center for Food Safety (www.centerforfoodsafety.org) suggest slightly eroding consumer support for GM-foods and declining trust in U.S. regulators. human consumption. In September 2000, consumer groups detected traces of StarLink corn in foods. StarLink was subsequently found in over three hundred brand-name products. The ensuing controversy exposed weaknesses in the U.S. regulatory system, in particular the inability of producers to effectively segregate crops in the U.S. grain handling system. 52 It also exposed as ineffective the EPA's 1999 request to farmers to plant non-GMO buffer crops around GM-crops. 53 Recalling products, testing activity, buybacks, and other measures have cost upstream producers, farmers, and downstream producers millions of dollars. 54 Environmental and consumer NGOs, for example Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the Organic Consumers Association, the Genetically Engineered Food Alert, the Pesticide Action Network, Sustain, and the Center for Food Safety, 55 seized the opportunity arising from the StarLink controversy to attack U.S. regulatory policy on GMOs. Most of these groups have also criticized the FDA's January 2001 proposal on notification and voluntary labeling. They have requested more rigorous safety and toxicological testing for all food additives and an end to what they have called the FDA's "no labeling, not safety testing" policy. 56 In support of their criticism, NGOs have alleged that, in several cases, including the FDA's 1994 decision on the FLAVR SAVR TM tomato, controversial scientific evidence was ignored. 57 It is unlikely, though, that these campaigns will be more effective in bringing about a fundamental change in regulatory policy than earlier efforts by environmental/consumer groups. As indicated in its 2001 proposal, the FDA has stuck firmly to its permissive approval and product-oriented labeling policy.
In light of the evidence discussed in this section, it appears that substantial public support for GMOs and the broad and cohesive pro-GMO coalition comprising producers and government agencies have made U.S. environmental/consumer groups very reluctant to campaign against GMOs. While the interaction effects of public risk perceptions and NGO campaigns are difficult to assess, the evidence provided by the StarLink controversy suggests that NGOs are willing to invest heavily in anti-GMO campaigns only when they perceive a substantial public outrage potential or when public aversion is already high. Thus the main strategy of NGOs has focused on legal measures and market pressure.
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The future of GM-crops and GM-food in the United States is thus likely to be decided in the market rather than through the regulatory process. The outcome will ultimately depend on downstream producer and farmer reactions to consumer pressure and, in the case of farmers, also productivity gains that can be achieved through agricultural biotechnology.
Producers
In contrast to Europe, producers in the United States have been able to form and maintain a coherent and well-organized pro-GMO coalition, including upstream and downstream producers and export-oriented farmers. Big agbiotech firms have been the leaders in this coalition. The latter have cooperated closely with regulators in what can be termed a "boardroom" structure (Gormley 1986 ) of biotech policy making (Holla 1995 , Moore 2000b . Only since 1999 has this system become somewhat more open to influence by the U.S. Congress and environmental/consumer groups.
Upstream Producers. Spurred by large-scale government funding, a well functioning venture capital market, and strong cooperation between industry and universities the U.S. biotech industry has developed into the world's largest.
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To recuperate its enormous R&D investments, the U.S. biotech industry needs biotech-friendly regulations.
The large majority of upstream producers in the United States are organized in a single association, the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO).
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In addition, large biotech firms such as AgrEvo, DuPont, and Pharmacia (which includes Monsanto) have also individually become involved in the regulatory process (Moore 2000b) . BIO and its members have persistently supported permissive approval regulations and have strongly opposed mandatory labeling, thus backing the FDA's regulatory policy (Caswell 2000) .
Homogenous preferences of its membership, substantial scientific expertise, and strong financial and other support from large biotech firms (e.g. AgrEvo, Monsanto, Pioneer Hi-Bred, Zeneca Plant Sciences, Calgene, Novartis) have equipped BIO with a large collective action capacity (Moore 2000b , Epstein 1996 . For example, to enhance consumer acceptance of GM-products seven large biotech companies and BIO formed the Council for Biotechnology Information. They plan to invest around 50 million USD per year, and possibly up to 250 million USD over three to five years for building public support for biotech foods.
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In addition, BIO maintains close relationships with the FDA and other U.S. regulatory agencies. A large part of BIO's staff consists of former government officials. Many observers have pointed to this "revolving door" policy in which employees move back and forth between the FDA, the EPA, and biotech companies (Moore 2000a , IATP Food Safety & Health 1999 . Industry views of biotechnology, notably in regard to economic competitiveness and pressure for fast commercialization to recoup R&D costs, have thus quickly found their way to U.S. biotech regulators (Moore 2000a) . This situation can, in Gormley's terms, by characterized as "boardroom" policy-making (Gormley 1986 ). This pattern of policy-making is the most susceptible to regulatory capture by industry. Indeed, Henry Miller, a former FDA official and vocal supporter of agbiotech, stated that "in this area, the U.S. government agencies have done exactly what big agribusiness has asked them to do and told them to do".
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Public opposition to GM-foods in the United States since the late 1990s, to the limited extent it exists, has, so far, affected the cohesion of upstream producers only at the margin. Most notably, it has (in addition to a variety of other factors) encouraged several large upstream producers (e.g. Novartis, AstraZeneca, Pharmacia, Aventis) to divest the agbiotech parts of their firms. It has, therefore, also contributed to a divergence of interests between large firms engaged in agricultural biotechnology and those, often smaller, firms engaged in medical biotechnology -with the latter blaming the former (notably Monsanto and Aventis) for negatively affecting the overall biotechnology market.
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Agricultural Producers. U.S. farmers have adopted the new technology at an almost breathtaking pace. The first GM-crops were planted in 1995/96. By the year 2000, the percent of acreage planted with GM-crops had grown to around 20 percent for corn and more than 50 percent for soybeans (Carpenter and Gianessi 2001: 3) . For 2001, the USDA predicts further growth for soybeans (from 54 to 63 percent) and cotton (from 61 to 64 percent), but not for GMcorn.
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These crops are genetically modified to be more resistant to insects and/or herbicides. In principle, the benefits of GM-crops include increased yield, lower production costs, easier management, and reduced pesticide use (Carpenter and Gianessi 2001, Baker 1999) . 65 The extent of benefits associated with the 61 Reuters, July 6, 2000; www.whybiotech.com. 62 See New York Times 2001, January 25. 63 The Economist, November 18, 2000 : 95, November 14, 2000 In 2000, Burrill's index of medical biotech firms rose by more than 50 percent, whereas agbiotech firms experienced a fall of more than 10 percent (Economist, 2000, November 4: 93; Business Week, November 6, 2000) . 64 www.transgen.de. 65 Insect resistant Bt corn varieties have enabled farmers to control the European Corn Borer, an insect pest that is hard to control through pesticides. Benefits include primarily increased yields and slightly reduced insecticide use. Insect resistant Bt cotton varieties control the three most destructive pests (tobacco budworm, cotton currently grown GM-crops remains contested, however, and seems to vary substantially across crop varieties. For example, Carpenter/Gianessi (2001) estimate aggregate gains in net revenues in 1999 of 35 million USD for Bt corn, 99m USD for Bt cotton, and 216m USD for RR soybeans. A survey of GM-crop performance by the USDA, on the other hand, indicated that yields from biotech crops were not consistently higher than yields from conventional crops (Foster 2001 , Fernandez-Cornejo 1999 . The USDA data suggest some gains for cotton. GM-soybeans, on the other hand, were neither associated with increased yields nor with reduced pesticide/insecticide use.
The benefits for farmers also depend on farm size. Due to economies of scale large farms are likely to profit more from GM-crops. Indeed, the available data suggest that middle to large-size industrialized farms have embraced biotechnology more rapidly than other farms (Carpenter and Gianessi 2001, Baker 1999) . We thus expect the former to favor permissive approval regulations, oppose mandatory labeling 66 , and support U.S. trade policies that open world markets to GM-products. Smaller family farms, for which GM-crops have been less beneficial, would benefit from regulations that impose costs on larger producers. We thus expect owners of smaller farms to favor stricter approval regulations and mandatory labeling. These differences in preferences, driven by variation in industrial structure, should be most pronounced in the case of corn and soybeans, which account for the largest share of GM-crops.
In accordance with our expectations, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), the largest U.S. farm organization, which is dominated by large agricultural producers, has fully supported the FDA's approval and labeling policy (Moore 2000b) . The National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC) on the other hand, a network of grassroots organizations working on family farm issues has criticized U.S. approval policy for GMOs. The NFFC also call for mandatory labeling, claiming that "consumers in the U.S. and around the globe have the right to know whether their food is genetically engineered" (NFFC 1999 , Moore 2000b ).
The American Soybean Association (ASA) and the National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) represent export-oriented producers with a large stake in GM-crops. Because producers of GM-soybeans and GM-corn are more exportdependent than other members of AFBF, ASA and NCGA have adopted even stronger pro-GMO and anti-labeling positions. Predictably also, concerns of ASA over problems of consumer acceptance and regulatory restrictions in other countries have been stronger than concerns of NCGA since U.S. soy producers bollworm, and pink bollworm). Benefits include reduced pesticide use and increased yields. Herbicide resistant Bt cotton allows farmers to use a broader spectrum of herbicides with smaller crop injury. Insect and virus resistant potato varieties have been used to reduce insecticide use. The introduction of a highly effective conventional insecticide and problems of marketing GM-potatoes have limited their adoption. Herbicide tolerant soybeans allow for more effective weed control at lower cost. 66 Opposition to labeling is motivated by the costs of segregating GM-and non-GM-crops, and by the risk of GM-products being stigmatized through labels.
are more dependent on export markets than U.S. corn producers: in 1996, 37 percent of U.S. produced soybeans or soybean products were exported, compared to 19 percent of U.S. produced corn (Moore 2000b) . Facing the inevitable, the ASA and the NCGA have been negotiating with the EU and EU member states separately to preserve U.S. exports to Europe through effective segregation and labeling. Nonetheless, both associations remain strong supporters of permissive approval policy and oppose mandatory labeling in the United States (Food Labeling News 1998b , NCGA 2000 . The U.S. Grains Council, which develops export markets for U.S. crops, has adopted very similar positions (U.S. Grains Council 2000) .
The American Corn Growers Association (ACGA) represents smaller family farms. In contrast to the ASA and NCGA, it has recommended stricter approval policies and mandatory labeling of all GM-foods, both domestic and foreign "to fulfill the consumer's right to know what foods they and their children eat" (FDA 1999) .
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Farm size and export-orientation thus account rather well for positions with regard to approval and labeling policy. Interest groups representing predominantly larger and export-oriented farmers oppose stricter approval policy and mandatory labeling. Most groups representing smaller farmers oriented towards the domestic U.S. market have not fundamentally opposed GM-foods, but have lobbied for stricter approval regulations and mandatory labeling of GM-foods.
Diverging interests due to differences in industrial structure, but also the fragmentation of the U.S. agricultural association system more generally, have limited the collective action capacity of farmers. More than 200 interest groups are involved in agricultural policy issues (Moore 2000b) . They specialize in different issues (general commodity associations, single commodity associations, and other specialized associations), and their general policies are marked by substantial ideological differences. U.S. GMO regulations have been congruent with the preferences of groups representing larger and export-oriented farm interests largely because these groups have been able to align themselves with biotech firms and food industry associations (Moore 2000b) . Smaller farmers producing for the domestic market and favoring stricter approval regulations and mandatory labeling have only recently gained some more influence in alliance with environmental and consumer groups.
Existing calculations of economic benefits from GM-crops ignore the influence of consumer acceptance, which has had a growing impact on the rate of adoption of GM-crops by U.S. farmers. Consumer opposition to GMOs in the EU, Japan, and other countries has increased, and so has the stringency of approval and labeling regulations outside the United States. As a result, demand for non-GM corn and non-GM soybeans has grown and U.S. soy and corn exports to countries with stricter regulations have suffered.
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In addition to this general trend, the StarLink controversy has led to a collapse of major export markets for U.S. corn, such as Japan, Korea, and Europe. As the scandal broke, Japan cut its U.S. corn purchases by 50%, Korea, the second largest U.S. corn export market, banned imports of U.S. corn entirely.
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In part due to high costs of segregation and identity preservation, export-oriented U.S. farmers have responded only very slowly to changing public risk perceptions.
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Whether U.S. farmers will, in the medium to long term, engage or desert the market for GM-crops depends largely on the behavior of downstream producers. It also depends on whether U.S. farmers continue to believe that GM-crops, and GM-soybeans in particular, create a narrow margin of profitability that keeps them afloat. GM-soybeans are the key issue in this regard, because they are the most important GM-crop exported to Europe. Foster, for example, notes that, apart from questions related to the economic benefits of GM-soybeans, GMsoybean production in the United States has been supported by massive subsidies. He claims that in the year 2000 38 percent of net receipts by U.S. soybean farmers were government subsidies. Thus, U.S. production of GMsoybeans may have grown not because of greater profitability, but due to subsidies.
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Downstream Producers. Until the late 1990s, U.S. downstream producers encountered very little consumer opposition to GM-foods, which started appearing on the U.S. market on a massive scale in the mid-1990s. They have not benefited much from the first generation of GMOs, which involves modified input rather than output traits. But large downstream producers in particular have expected greater benefits from the second generation of GMOs, due to output traits such as enhanced nutritional qualities. 72 68 U.S. corn exports to Europe decreased from 2 million tons in marketing year 1997/98 to 137,000 tons in 1999, while in the same time-period soybean exports dropped from 11 million tons to 6 million tons (ACGA 2000 , Feedstuffs 1999 ). In comparison, U.S. wheat exports to the EU increased in that time-period. Whereas 27 percent of all U.S. soybean meal exports went to the EU in the 1997/98 marketing year, the EU only accounted for 7 percent of all U.S. soybean meal exports a year later (Feedstuffs 1999) . The value of U.S. exports decreased by almost half (from 2.1 bU.S.D to 1.1 bU.S.D) between 1996 and 1999 (Dann 2000) . In parallel to this development, Brazilian non-GM soy exports to the EU increased from 10.1 million tons in 1996 to 15.1 million tons in 1998 (Dann 2000) . 69 www.isaaa.org; www.rafi.org; www.acga.org. An informal survey among 400 U.S. farmers in January 2000 indicated that GM soy crops would drop by 15 percent and GM corn crops would drop by 22-24 percent in 2000. This result was backed up by a U.S. Department of Agriculture survey indicating that GM corn crops would decrease by 20% and soybeans by 6 percent in 2000 (Dann 2000) . 70 For example: a survey among 100 Midwest grain elevators, conducted in September 1999, found that only 8 percent of the elevators were segregating non-GM soybeans and only 11 percent were segregating non-GM corn (Feedstuffs 1999) . 71 Communication with James Foster, June 3, 2001. 72 Second-generation GM-foods are expected to have decreased allergenicity, lower fat content, and improved freshness and taste. Some biotech foods might also deliver medicines, e.g. vaccines or compounds that help prevent cancer (www.bio.org).
The vast majority of large downstream producers have thus supported the FDA's permissive approval and no-labeling policy, arguing that labeling would stigmatize their products and brands, and that it would be costly to implement. Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA) and The National Food Processors Association (NFPA), the two largest associations of the U.S. food processing industry, have been the most influential representatives of large downstream producer interests. GMA represents primarily processors of branded foods, NFPA represents firms that process and package fruits, vegetables, meat, fish, specialty food, and beverage products (Moore 2000b , FDA 1999 . 73 In contrast, many smaller, specialized food processors and retailers, notably those in the organic food business, have supported stricter approval and labeling regulations. In their lobbying efforts, they have frequently associated themselves with consumer NGOs, for example, Consumers Union, the Center for Food Safety, or the Alliance for Bio-Integrity.
In response to growing consumer concerns in the United States over GM-foods GMA and NFPA have, since the late 1990s, sought to reverse that trend through intensified lobbying of policy-makers and public campaigns.
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Pro-GM-food manufacturers and retailers have also founded the Alliance for Better Foods (ABF), which so far has invested several dozen million USD in public relations activities and election campaign contributions (Dann 2000) .
These efforts by downstream producers have been somewhat weakened by defections from the pro-GMO coalition of several large and many smaller U.S. food processors, retailers, and wholesalers. In spring 1999, for example, Greenpeace sent letters to major baby food companies, asking if they had taken any steps to ensure that they were not using GM-ingredients. In response, Gerber and Heinz, two large baby food producers, switched to non-GMingredients.
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Firms such as McDonalds, McCain Foods, Frito-Lay, IAMS pet foods, Whole Foods Market, Wild Oats Markets, Seagram, and a range of others have also reduced or eliminated GM-foods from their U.S. business in response to NGO campaigns.
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The StarLink problem has led to another wave of defections. Archer Daniels Midland, for example, which purchases around 30 percent of all corn, soybeans, and wheat in the United States announced that it expected U.S. farmers and grain elevators to start separating and segregating GM-and non-GM crops. Other large processors such as ConAgra and Cargill have initiated measures to segregate GM-crops from non-GM crops as a consequence of the StarLink scandal. yet led firms to actively challenge the government's biotechnology policy. Only a significant increase of consumer pressure on the food market might result in a change of downstream producers' position.
Conclusion
Permissive approval practices and the absence of mandatory labeling in the United States can be accounted for in terms of the collective action capacity of consumers and producers. Low public concern about GM-foods and high public trust in regulatory authorities and scientists have made it very difficult for NGOs to mobilize their members and other latent supporters on GMO issues. Most U.S. environmental/consumer groups have become active on GMO issues much later than their European counterparts. Moreover, most U.S. NGOs have not fundamentally opposed GMOs, but have requested stricter approval regulations and mandatory labeling. They have relied mostly on the lobbying of policymakers and legal action against regulatory agencies and agbiotech firms, rather than on the more activist strategies favored by many of their European counterparts.
Agricultural biotechnology has been supported by a relatively homogeneous, well-organized, and well-funded coalition of upstream producers, exportoriented farmers and their commodity associations, and downstream producers. Upstream producers in particular have enjoyed privileged access to U.S. regulatory agencies, notably the FDA. Somewhat elevated public concern over GMOs since the late 1990s, and the StarLink controversy in particular, have produced several faultlines in the pro-GMO coalition. First, several large biotech firms have divested their agbiotech branches and interests between firms engaged in medical and firms engaged in agricultural biotechnology have begun to diverge. Second, some large and many small downstream producers have moved towards GMO-free products and labeling, weakening the pro-GMO campaigns of downstream producer groups and dividing downstream producers as a whole. Third, the StarLink crisis has led to conflicts between farmers and upstream producers over damages and their compensation.
Whether these rifts could eventually lead to a disintegration of the producer coalition in the United States remains an open question. If they do, and if such disintegration coincides with a complete closure of European and Asian markets to U.S. GM-crops, many downstream producers and farmers in the United States are likely to desert the market for GM-crops. Technical difficulties and high costs of segregating and preserving the identity of conventional crops throughout the food chain as well as labeling products may, under the circumstances mentioned, contribute to this tendency.
Comparison
In this final section we compare the results of the case studies on the European Union and the United States along the lines set by the theoretical argument focusing on the collective action capacity of consumer and producer interests.
Regulatory outcomes in the European Union and the United States
In the mid-1980s, the starting point of the analysis, the biotechnology policies of the EU and the United States were very similar. At the end of the 1980s, they began to diverge. From 1990 on, the EU has concentrated on process-oriented regulations and has adopted more stringent approval and labeling standards than the United States. As a consequence, very few GMOs have been approved for commercialization in the EU, commercial planting of GM-crops is almost nonexistent in EU countries, and the number of field trials is far lower than in the United States. The number of labeled GM-products on the EU market has approached zero as producers have chosen to give up rather than label GMfoods. The EU's market for GMOs has thus shrunk to (an also declining market for) GM food ingredients and animal feed below the threshold for mandatory labeling.
U.S. regulatory policy has, in the 1990s, moved into a more permissive direction. Regulators have taken the position that GM-foods and feeds are generally safe as long as the application of biotechnology does not lead to substantially different properties of food or feed products. Following this product-oriented policy, the FDA and the USDA have, through an informal notification procedure and without pre-market risk-assessments, approved most industry requests for field-testing and commercialization of GMOs. Producers may voluntarily label GM-foods but are not obliged to do so. More than 50 GMproducts are on the U.S. market, thousands of field tests have been authorized, and GM-crop acreage increased dramatically from 1996 to 2000.
Influence of Environmental and Consumer Groups
Conventional theories of regulation predict that environmental and consumer groups, because of their large and heterogeneous membership, experience greater problems than producers in mobilizing supporters and influencing public policy. We found, however, that the collective action capacity of environmental and consumer groups has varied substantially across the EU and the United States. This variation can be traced back to differences in public perceptions of agricultural biotechnology, consumer trust in regulatory authorities, and differences in access to policy-making processes.
In the EU, negative public perceptions of agricultural biotechnology and low trust in regulators (mostly the result of major food safety crises) have facilitated strong and sustained NGO engagement in the issue, particularly since the mid1990s. NGOs were thus able to apply strong market pressure by launching powerful campaigns against upstream and downstream producers. These campaigns have also transformed the GMO issue into one of "high saliency" and (in the eyes of the wider public) "low complexity" -which tends to produce a "hearing room" pattern of policy-making. The latter pattern is conducive to public interest group participation. In addition, the multi-level nature of EU policy-making and especially the involvement of the European Parliament have opened the door to strong NGO influence on policy-decisions.
In the United States, relatively positive consumer perceptions of agricultural biotechnology and high trust in regulators and scientists (mostly due to the absence of larger food safety crises) have made it difficult for NGOs to mobilize their supporters on the GMO issue and influence producers and policy-makers. NGO influence on policy-making in this area has also been constrained by limited institutional access: most important decisions have been taken by one independent agency, the FDA, which contrasts quite substantially with the multilayered decision-making system of the EU. As a result, U.S. environmental and consumer groups have become involved in agbiotech issues much later than their European counterparts. NGO activity on a larger scale began only in the late 1990s. At that time, public opinion on GMOs turned somewhat more negative and the StarLink controversy emerged. In contrast to their European counterparts, most U.S. NGOs have lobbied for stricter approval procedures and mandatory labeling rather than a ban on GMOs. So far the FDA and the USDA have remained largely immune to this pressure.
Influence of Producers
While conventional theories of regulation tend to regard producers as a homogenous interest group, we distinguished upstream producers (agbiotech firms), producers (farmers), and downstream producers (wholesalers, retailers, food processors). We hypothesized that differences in industrial structure and the extent of NGO opposition to GMOs account for variation in the collective action capacity of pro-GMO producers.
In the EU, negative consumer perceptions of GM-foods and NGO campaigns have divided producers and have thus diminished the collective action capacity of pro-GMO interests. Large upstream producers, such as Monsanto and Novartis, became major targets of NGO campaigns and have remained on the defensive. EU farmers, which throughout the 1990s and beyond have suffered from major disturbances and restructuring in European food markets, have become increasingly opposed to GMOs. This opposition is bound to grow further, especially if GM-products with stronger competitive effects on EU farm produce enter the EU market. NGO pressure and negative public risk perceptions have driven downstream producers into supporting mandatory labeling and stricter approval standards. While most downstream producers expected that labeling might stop the anti-GMO trend half way, the unintended effect was exposure of labeled GM-foods to even greater consumer and NGO pressure. As a result, downstream producers have deserted the market for labeled GM-foods, hoping that the consumer backlash will not spread to thousands of processed foods in the EU that contain GMOs below the threshold for mandatory labeling.
U.S. policy has, from the very beginning, been supported by a homogeneous, well-organized, and well-funded coalition of export-oriented farmers, commodity associations, the upstream industry, and downstream producers. These producer interests have enjoyed privileged access to U.S. regulatory agencies, notably the FDA. U.S. policy-making in this area has thus been marked by a "board-room" pattern, the opposite of the "hearing-room" that has prevailed in the EU.
The most serious challenge to U.S. GMO-policy so far has emanated from somewhat increasing public concerns about agricultural biotechnology since the late 1990s, and the StarLink controversy, which broke out in fall 2000. In part motivated by these developments as well as the backlash in Europe and elsewhere, several large biotech firms have divested their agbiotech divisions, thus contributing to growing differences of interest between medical and agricultural biotech firms. Increased consumer and NGO pressure has encouraged some downstream producers to move towards GMO-free products and voluntary labeling. This development has weakened pro-GMO campaigns by up-and downstream producer groups. The StarLink controversy has also led to conflicts between farmers and upstream producers over damages and compensation. It appears unlikely, however, that these differences among producers will grow to the extent observed in the EU.
In summary, the empirical observations reported in the two case studies are largely congruent with the theoretical argument. GMO regulations tend towards greater stringency when: first, the collective action capacity of environmental/consumer interests is high -the latter resulting from negative public perceptions of the technology concerned, low public trust in regulators, and privileged access of public interest groups to the policy-making process; second, the collective action potential of producer interests is low due to heterogeneous interests resulting from industrial structure and market pressure exerted by public interest groups.
